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Abstract 
With Soeharto’s demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost effective 
government. The economy has been slow to recover from the crisis, and even 
modest growth of around 3–4% may not be able to be maintained: neither 
stagnation nor decline is out of the question. It is therefore urgent to overhaul 
Indonesia’s public sector institutions, which had been co-opted by Soeharto 
into his economy-wide ‘franchise’—a system of government devoted to the 
objective of redistributing income and wealth from the weak to the strong 
while simultaneously maintaining rapid growth. This franchise has 
disintegrated in the absence of a clear ‘owner’, with its various component 
parts now working at cross purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing 
fashion. The result has been a significant decline in the security of property 
rights and the postponement of a convincing economic rebound. To reform 
the public sector institutions it will be necessary to undertake a radical 
overhaul of personnel management practices and salary structures, with the 
objective of providing strong incentives for officials to work in the public 
interest. The prospects for such reform, however, seem slight. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia’s long-serving president, Soeharto, became more unpopular the longer he 
remained in office. The economic crisis that began in mid 1997 provided the 
conditions under which at last he was able to be forced out, only a couple of months 
after he had been elected unopposed to a seventh five-year term. Since then the 
country has been able to manage a relatively peaceful transition to a more genuine 
democracy. The first stage of this began with the formal handover of power by 
Soeharto to his deputy, BJ Habibie, in May 1998. The second involved the holding of 
elections for the parliament in June 1999, and the subsequent indirect election of 
Abdurrahman Wahid by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) as the first 
president of the new democratic era. The third saw the dismissal of Wahid in July 
2001, and his replacement by Megawati Soekarnoputri, also by the MPR.  
Macroeconomic conditions have stabilised after the astonishing upheaval in 1997–98. 
The exchange rate stabilised many months ago, and recently has been appreciating. 
Inflation, although still rather high relative to Indonesia’s neighbours, is back to 
levels that had become the norm prior to the crisis, and interest rates have also 
declined to roughly pre-crisis levels. But short-term forecasts are for growth at the 
rate of just 3–4 percent per annum—half the average growth rate maintained over 
three decades of Soeharto’s rule.  
More important, there are serious doubts as to whether even this modest rate—
which is inadequate if poverty is to be reduced appreciably—can be maintained into 
the future. One very worrying economic indicator is the level of investment, which 
languishes at just three-quarters of its level prior to the crisis. Growth is possible 
without new investment given that there is still unutilised production capacity 
during recovery from recession, but as existing capacity becomes more fully utilised, 
the scope for further growth becomes increasingly limited. The failure of business 
investment to recover can only be interpreted as a sign of a continuing lack of 
confidence that Indonesia’s new democracy will give rise to an effective government 
capable of doing the things needed to allow the private sector to function properly. 
Is ‘muddling through’ the best that can be expected? Is it the worst? 
It is common in Indonesia these days for people to talk about ‘muddling through’ 
(e.g. Business News 10 February 2003). Few seem to think it possible to get back to 7–
8% growth, but at the same time, few seem to think that growth might fall back to 
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zero or even turn negative again. These more pessimistic possibilities should be 
taken more seriously. After all, ineffective government under Indonesia’s first 
president, Sukarno, resulted first in stagnation and then negative growth during the 
last several years of his rule, contributing to political instability, a violent change of 
regime, and an effective takeover of government by the army.  
But perhaps even this does not reflect the limit of how bad things could become. 
Consider the case of Nigeria, a country whose per capita income was somewhat 
higher than Indonesia’s in the late 1960s. It also has a large population and large oil 
resources, making it an interesting and relevant comparator. The growth 
performance of these two countries was very similar up until the late 1970s, when 
Nigeria’s real GNP stagnated and then began to decline from the beginning of the 
1980s; modest positive growth did not reappear until late in the decade (Figure 1). 
Although Indonesia’s growth faltered slightly in the early 1980s with the decline in 
world oil prices, it was able to recover very quickly thanks to sound management by 
its macroeconomic policy makers. Nigeria’s real GDP in 1996 was only 2.2 times its 
level at the end of the 1960s, whereas Indonesia’s was 6.3 times its level at that time.  
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Source: World Bank World Tables 
It is important, therefore, not to underestimate the possible consequences of 
ineffective government. Indonesians have already been reminded how quickly the 
quality of government can decline under incompetent leadership and a weak 
bureaucracy. Fortunately, the erratic Abdurrahman Wahid was able to be removed 
before he was able to do much damage (Siregar 2001: 278–9), but doing so relied on 
the availability of a replacement who commanded considerable popular support,1 
and who was able to put together a reasonably competent cabinet. The people may 
not be so fortunate in the future, should they happen to choose poorly in a 
presidential election.  
With these comments as background, the aims of this paper are:  
♦ to explain why Soeharto’s regime was effective, and why subsequent 
governments have been much less effective 
♦ to suggest the reforms needed if effectiveness is to be regained (and to discuss 
other kinds of reform initiatives) 
♦ and to comment briefly on the prospects for a return to rapid economic growth. 
I shall argue here that with Soeharto’s demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost 
effective government. By gaining democracy I mean that the people now have the 
genuine opportunity to vote out incumbent governments at regular intervals, and I 
interpret effective government in a purely economic sense to mean doing what is 
needed to achieve rapid growth—with the expectation that the benefits of growth 
will be widely spread amongst the population, as was the case during the Soeharto 
era. Specifically, I assume that rapid economic growth depends on a complementary 
relationship between the private and public sectors, in which the public sector 
provides things desired by the public but which the private sector is not able to 
produce.  
                                                 
1 Megawati’s party had won almost three times as many votes than Wahid’s in the 1999 election. 
  6
I argue that by far the most important task of the public sector is to ensure the rule of 
law and the security of property.2 In turn, this requires the drafting and enactment of 
laws and provision of the means to enforce them: a judiciary, a legal bureaucracy 
(including a public prosecutor), and a police force. The weaker is the rule of law and 
the security of property, the weaker is the incentive to invest and to work.3 Since 
growth or development depends on investment and the supply of effort by 
individuals, economic performance of an economy overall can be expected to be, and 
is, strongly correlated with the security of property (Roll and Talbott 2002: 15–16). 
The provision of physical infrastructure by the public sector is also important: roads, 
ports, airports, storm-water drainage and flood control, sewerage and so on. Beyond 
this, there is room for debate as to what other things governments should provide, 
but this is outside the scope of the present discussion. The principal focus here is on 
the crucially important provision of the rule of law. 
THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE 
It is a truism that the overall performance of any organisation or regime depends on 
the performance of the individuals that comprise it, other things equal. In turn, 
individuals’ performance depends on the strength of the incentives they face, both 
positive and negative. I shall argue that the incentives for good performance in the 
public sector institutions during the Soeharto era were strong—relative to Soeharto’s 
objectives, which happened to coincide largely with society’s objectives. By contrast, 
the incentives for good performance in those institutions subsequently have become 
weak—relative to society’s objectives. The decline in Indonesia’s economic performance 
since Soeharto’s demise can be explained by this change in the structure of 
incentives facing officials in the public sector institutions.  
                                                 
2 Interestingly, a similar argument has recently been put in relation to priorities that need to be 
followed in establishing a new democratic regime in post-war Iraq (McDougall  2003). 
3 ‘Why does an individual invest unless to gain something for himself and his family? How can he 
ensure that gains flowing from his activity be appropriated and secured other than through a system 
of well-defined property rights?’ (O’Driscoll and Hoskins 2003: 9). 
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Soeharto’s franchise system of government  
Soeharto created incentives for effective government within what I have described 
elsewhere as a ‘franchise’ system (McLeod 2000). A more descriptive, if 
cumbersome, title would be ‘multi-branch, multi-level franchise’.4 The branches of 
the franchise included: the legislature (MPR, DPR5 and tame political parties); the 
judiciary and the legal bureaucracy; the military/police; the bureaucracy (including 
non-department agencies, especially the logistics agency, Bulog, and the central 
bank, Bank Indonesia); and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including banks. 
Most of the branches encompassed a number of levels. Legislatures existed at 
national, provincial and district/municipality levels, while the bureaucracy 
extended right down to the villages. The hierarchy of the judiciary extended down 
from the Supreme Court through the High Court to the district courts. The army also 
had regional divisions, as did the state banks. 
The franchise analogy is useful because of a number of important characteristics the 
Soeharto regime shared in common with franchises in the world of commerce, such 
as McDonalds and Starbucks. Such franchises are based on a mutually advantageous 
contractual relationship between the franchisor and multiple franchisees; the 
franchisees pay to join and to continue as members; the franchisor designs the 
product line and sets the overall operating parameters; and other aspects of 
management are delegated to the franchisees. In the case of Soeharto’s franchise, the 
‘product’ was the right to engage in ‘private taxation’—that is, various forms of 
taxation imposed by public sector officials (franchisees) for their personal benefit.  
Private  taxation 
As with all franchises, success depended crucially on product design, so the key here 
was the nature of this private tax system. The most effective taxation regimes rely 
heavily on low rates of tax imposed on a large tax base. High tax rates tend to kill off 
the economic activity to which they are applied, and therefore fail to maximise tax 
                                                 
4 Liddle (1985: 71) refers to the political structure of the New Order as ‘a steeply-ascending pyramid 
in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency’. Crouch (1991: 57) 
refers simply to ‘Soeharto’s patronage network’. My justification for using the ‘franchise’ analogy is 
discussed below. 
5 The MPR is the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly; the DPR is the House of Representatives. 
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revenue. Soeharto appears to have been highly unusual among corrupt autocrats 
and dictators in his understanding and application of this principle, and it is this that 
explains the fact that such rapid economic growth could be sustained over three 
decades, despite Indonesia coming to have a reputation as one of the most corrupt 
nations in the world. 
There are numerous ways in which public sector officials can impose private 
taxation, but two broad classes are of particular importance. The first is extortion. 
Some obvious examples are when people and firms are forced to pay officials if they 
want to be issued with, or to retain, licences required to undertake particular 
activities, or if they want to induce the officials actually to provide services to which 
the people and firms in question are already entitled, including protection by the 
police against violence and intimidation. The second is rent generation and 
harvesting. An example of this is public sector direction of the exploitation of natural 
resources for the benefit of the few at the cost of the many, such as the award of 
timber concessions to favoured individuals or companies. Another is where an 
official provides a firm with a legal monopoly, and the firm shares the rents 
generated by the monopoly with the official. A third is where the state, or a state-
owned enterprise, engages in a commercial transaction with a private sector entity 
on terms very much more advantageous to the latter than those prevailing in the 
market. In both cases, the public sector official—who may be the president, at one 
extreme, or a petty official at the lowest level of local government, at the other—
gains. In the first case the counterparty loses; in the second the counterparty also 
gains, at the expense of the general public.6  
The mix of these two kinds of private taxation is important. Extortion is a violation 
of property rights, and is clearly a drag on economic performance for that reason: if 
it becomes excessive it will drive the taxed economic activity out of existence. 
Natural resource exploitation (in the absence of reasonable royalty payments to the 
government) amounts to wealth redistribution away from the general public in 
favour of those granted rights to exploitation and the public sector officials with 
                                                 
6 These two forms of private taxation can be interpreted to reflect the ‘KK’ in KKN—Indonesia’s 
popular acronym for corruption, collusion and nepotism, if we take corruption to mean illegal levies 
imposed by officials, and collusion to mean mutually advantageous arrangements between officials 
and crony companies, respectively. Nepotism is simply a particular form of collusion. 
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whom the rents are shared. It avoids the disadvantage of hindering other economic 
activity, however, since the general public presumably has only the vaguest 
perception that it shares in the ownership of these resources as a constitutional 
right,7 and therefore has little sense of direct loss.  
Rent creation and harvesting, on the other hand, has been suggested by some 
actually to promote economic progress. The implicit argument is that if firms can be 
given protection from competition this will enable them to earn high profits that can 
then be reinvested, thus generating further growth. Whether this is true is an 
empirical issue; presumably the answer depends in part on how severely the process 
of resource allocation is distorted in order to generate rents.8 If the distortions are 
relatively mild, the resulting implicit taxes on other activities and entities will be 
small, and there may be little or no noticeable impact on economic growth overall. 
This seems to have been the case during most of the New Order period, although it 
may be argued that the unbridled greed of the Soeharto children and grandchildren 
resulted in increasingly large distortions during the last several years before the 
crisis.9 
One important difference between the first kind of private taxation and the second is 
that the former puts wealth in the pockets of public sector officials that may lack 
entrepreneurial capability, whereas the latter, by definition, shifts wealth in favour 
of people who do. To put it in simple terms, in one case ill-gotten gains end up being 
reinvested in the economy, while in the other they end up in Swiss bank accounts 
(Salim 1997: 69), or being frittered away on consumption. These less desirable 
outcomes can be avoided if officials that end up controlling economic resources 
                                                 
7 Article 33, paragraph 3 of the constitution states that ‘The land, the waters and the natural riches 
contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.’ 
8 This raises the interesting question of which forms of rent generation deliver the largest rent harvest 
to crony companies for a given cost to the rest of the economy. For example, privileges for exporters 
may be less damaging than those for producers of import substitutes, while those for producers of 
non-tradables may be less damaging still. If so, this would help to explain why the pattern of 
privileges arguably has tended to shift from import substitution to exports to non-tradables over time 
in Indonesia. Such questions are beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 Some well known examples include the monopolization of domestic trade in cloves, the attempt to 
privately tax the sale of beer in Bali, the attempt to monopolize sales of shoes to schoolchildren 
(McLeod 2000), and the introduction of the national car project (Manning and Jayasuriya 1996: 18–21). 
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(such as forestry concessions), perhaps upon their retirement from the armed forces, 
sub-contract the work of exploiting those resources to more entrepreneurially 
talented individuals; in Indonesia these are known as ‘cukong’ relationships (Liddle 
1985: 78; Elson 2001: 151–2). In essence this is simply another form of rent-generation 
and harvesting. The large-scale domestic reinvestment of rents is both a reflection of, 
and an explanation for, the regime’s success in sustaining a high rate of economic 
growth over three decades. 
Soeharto as franchise owner 
In a business franchise, there is no question of the owner being forced out (although, 
of course, if it is unsuccessful the franchisees will desert it). But Soeharto’s franchise 
was a political system from which, in principle, he could be removed through the 
election process. To avoid this possibility, as is well-known, the election system was 
rigged so that he could not be voted out of office (Liddle 1985: 71–2; Elson 2001: 186–
90). At the same time, he dealt with actual or potential threats from within by buying 
off the individuals in question with appointments to senior positions within the 
bureaucracy, the judiciary and SOEs, or by granting privileged access to timber 
concessions and so on. Those who could not be neutralised in this manner could 
expect to be harshly dealt with. Public sector officials who incurred the displeasure 
of Soeharto or his franchisees would find their career advancement blocked in one 
way or another, while others found themselves being imprisoned (Crouch 1991: 56; 
Cole and Slade 1998: 65; Lindsey 2001: 56–7). 
Franchisees’ benefits, obligations and incentives 
Franchisees in each of the branches enjoyed the opportunity to collect or share in 
private tax revenues, and could hope for promotion to higher levels of the 
franchise—with commensurately higher rewards—over time. They also enjoyed 
ready opportunities to engage in nepotism, and could expect support from higher 
levels, and from other branches, of the franchise. In return for all this, they were 
required to pay (in cash or kind) to join, and for continuing membership.10 They 
                                                 
10 An infamous example is the case of a bupati (regent) in Yogyakarta province, who was alleged to 
have paid the equivalent of about US$425,000 in order to secure his reappointment. The journalist 
who reported the allegations had also reported on irregularities in the management of the regency’s 
poverty alleviation program funds, and was subsequently murdered by a group of thugs (Jakarta Post 
17 September and 16 October 1996). 
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were expected to assist with the recruitment of lower-level franchisees and with the 
promotion of the better performers. They also had to shift poor performers out of the 
way of others who could do better, and to deal with threats to the franchise.11 
In terms of incentives, franchisees had the opportunity to become very wealthy if 
they served the interests of the franchise well. On the other hand, there was the 
threat of exclusion, or worse, if they failed to do so, or if their actions threatened the 
well-being of the franchise.12 In short, Soeharto’s franchise system had at its core a 
strong system of carrots and sticks designed to elicit good performance from its 
franchisees. 
Roles of the branches 
Each public sector institution was intended to serve the interests of the general 
public, but in cases where there was any conflict, the interests of the franchise 
generally took precedence. The main specific roles of each branch in serving the 
franchise included the following: 
The legislature allowed the regime to present a facade of democracy to the world and 
to the Indonesian public, which helped it to tap into a significant inflow of resources 
from multilateral and bilateral donors. Its main functions were to rubber-stamp 
legislation submitted by the government; to absorb and deflect public criticism of the 
government’s performance; and to provide attractive positions into which people 
could be shifted from elsewhere in the franchise. 
The judiciary and legal bureaucracy were expected to deflect legal challenges to the 
regime and the actions of franchisees;13 to impose legal sanctions on opponents of 
                                                 
11 Liddle (1985: 76) discusses how the regime dealt with opposition from students and politically 
organized Islam, for example. 
12 A fascinating example of the lengths to which Soeharto would go in dealing with lack of discipline 
within the franchise was his replacement of the customs service in 1984 with the private company 
Societe Generale de Surveillance (Muir 1986: 21). The customs inspection process had come to impose 
such heavy private taxation on international trade as to significantly constrain economic growth. 
13 A rare exception was the upholding by the Supreme Court of a previous court decision in favour of 
villagers who had been displaced without adequate compensation by the government’s Kedung 
Ombo dam project. But this decision was subsequently overridden by the Supreme Court itself after 
the government appealed, demonstrating clearly the ‘proper place’ of the judiciary within the 
franchise system (Chatterjee 1995; Association for International Water and Forest Studies, no date). 
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the regime; to protect and further the interests of privileged firms and individuals 
within the private sector; and, like the legislature, to provide attractive positions into 
which people could be shifted from elsewhere in the franchise. 
The military/police provided the coercive force by which the regime was protected 
against challenges (for example, from students, Moslems, secessionists, and NGOs). 
Other major functions included helping to ensure election victories for the 
government party, Golkar (Crouch 1991: 54), and ‘[ferreting] out dissent within the 
government’ (Liddle 1985: 76). Finally, it helped to suppress militant labour, which 
might otherwise have hindered firms’ growth and the creation of employment 
opportunities, especially in manufacturing.14 
The bureaucracy was responsible for devising and implementing economic policies 
conducive to rapid economic growth, by virtue of which the size of the tax base for 
private taxation could be steadily increased. It also implemented a wide range of 
policies whose purpose was to generate rents for privileged companies and 
individuals; in turn, these rents were shared with the franchise through various 
mechanisms (McLeod 2000). At the same time, it implemented a number of other 
policies that were intended to generate public support for the regime—or at least to 
soften criticism of it—such as increasing the public’s access to education and health 
services,15 and providing various kinds of subsidies for farmers and small 
businesses.16 
The primary role of the state-owned enterprises was to generate rents for privileged 
private sector companies by way of distorted pricing in its transactions with them. 
Purchases were made at excessively high prices, sales at excessively low prices, and 
                                                 
14 A sickening example of this involved the ‘abduction, rape and murder in May of a 23 year old 
female worker, Marsinah, who had helped organise a strike at a watch factory in Surabaya’ (Fane 
1994: 38). The case has never been resolved satisfactorily (Amnesty International, no date).  
15 Primary and secondary school enrolments as a percentage of the respective school age populations 
grew dramatically during the Soeharto era, and there were enormous improvements in health 
indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality. As Liddle points out, however, the 
beneficiaries of such spending by the government also included ‘[b]uilders, cement manufacturers, 
textbook printers, and the bureaucrats who award the contracts…’ (Liddle 1985: 80).  
16 Two of the best known programs were the Bimas ‘mass guidance’ scheme for small farmers 
(Subroto 1998: 79), and the KIK/KMKP loans for small business program (Bolnick 1982). 
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loans or credit were provided at below market rates—often with the added benefit of 
optional default (Fane 1994: 31).17 In addition the SOEs also served to provide 
attractive positions for individuals being transferred from elsewhere in the franchise. 
The regime provided effective government 
In summary, the franchise was designed to provide franchisees with strong 
incentives to work for its success.18 It prospered by drawing lightly on a ‘tax base’ 
that comprised a large part of the economy as a whole, and by implementing 
economic policies that helped the private sector to generate rapid economic growth 
in order that the tax base would also grow rapidly. Thus there was a close 
correspondence between the interests of the franchise and the interests of the general 
public, notwithstanding the fact that the effect of private taxation was to redistribute 
income and wealth from the weak to the strong. Despite the legendary corruption 
and incompetence of the legal system and the bureaucracy, the rules of the game 
enforced by the franchisor were such that property rights were relatively secure for 
the majority of the population.19 
To my knowledge, no student of Indonesia came close to predicting how the regime 
would end, nor what would happen subsequently. For example Liddle (1985: 86) 
wondered about ‘the possibility that the New Order pyramid [would] be destroyed 
as a result of a succession struggle’. He argued that this outcome was unlikely 
because of ‘the special position of the military in the pyramid’ and the extent to 
which younger officers had been incorporated into the cukong system. Even if 
Soeharto were overthrown, however, he expected this system to remain, ‘alongside 
                                                 
17 Aside from the state banks, the state oil company, Pertamina, probably played the preeminent role  
of this kind amongst all the SOEs (Laksamana.Net  June 30, 2002). 
18 Liddle (1985: 74) refers similarly to ‘the building of performance-based support within the 
pyramid’. 
19 Liddle (1985: 78) argues that periodic crackdowns on corruption ‘[encouraged] the public to believe 
that the government [was] at least well intentioned’. No doubt there is something in this, but I would 
argue also that Soeharto appreciated that excessive infringement of property rights by individual 
franchisees was inimical to the interests of the franchise as a whole. The replacement of the 
notoriously corrupt customs service by a private company in 1985 (Elson 2001: 247), and the 
‘mysterious shootings’ of thousands of criminals and extortionists in the early and mid-1980s (ibid: 
236–8) can readily be interpreted in this light. 
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something very like the present New Order pyramid’ (ibid: 87). Similarly, Crouch 
(1991: 65) talked in terms of a smooth transition from Soeharto to his successor, with 
his ‘powers and authority more or less intact’, but perceived an equal possibility that 
‘in the absence of a generally accepted heir, the new president [would] only take 
power after an intense struggle within the military elite’. So far as democracy was 
concerned, however, he argued that ‘the urban middle class and the business class 
… [were] not yet strong enough to impose their will on the government and force 
increased popular representation’ (ibid: 63). In the end it was indeed the middle class 
and the business community—including foreigners—that imposed their will on the 
government, not with their votes but by sending their capital offshore and 
precipitating the economic crisis that led ultimately to the breakthrough of 
democracy. 
The franchise has in fact disintegrated with the passing of Soeharto. None of his 
successors has been able to exert much control over its several branches, which are 
now working at cross purposes, resulting in high levels of private taxation in some 
areas of the economy. Property rights have therefore become much less secure for 
both firms and individuals (see, for example, Jakarta Post 10 May, 2003). The failure 
of investment spending to recover in these circumstances is not surprising. 
THE DEMISE OF THE FRANCHISE  
The system started to fall apart as the current crisis got under way in mid 1997 and 
Soeharto began to lose control. Most obviously, several of the business 
conglomerates, previously content to prosper on the basis of policies that 
considerably reduced their need to compete with other firms, now perceived that the 
days of the franchise were numbered. There was a strong possibility that there might 
be no opportunities at all beyond the next few months to harvest any more rents. 
Moreover, by this time they were quite capable of investing and operating offshore, 
such as in the rapidly opening Chinese economy. There was therefore both a strong 
incentive and plenty of scope for them to take what they could, while they could, 
resulting in a radical shift in behaviour that amounted to looting the national 
treasury.  
The great bank robbery 
The primary mechanism by which they did so was by defaulting on the loans that 
they had received from the state banks and their own banks—in some cases, 
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increasing the volume of such loans considerably first, using funds supplied by the 
central bank (McLeod forthcoming). The effect of walking away from their debts was 
significantly to enrich themselves at the expense of the general public, by virtue of 
the fact that the government took it upon itself to guarantee all of the liabilities of the 
banking system.20 This resulted in an extraordinarily large redistribution of wealth 
within Indonesian society, which has been estimated to exceed 40% of GDP in value 
(Fane and McLeod 2002: 288). The wealthy individuals in question could not have 
succeeded in this endeavour were it not for a mixture of incompetence and 
corruption within the bureaucracy and the judiciary, together with political pressure 
applied to these branches of the franchise by Soeharto himself, and later by his 
successors.21  
The most egregious shortcoming on the part of the policy makers was to enter into 
fatally flawed Master Shareholder Settlement Agreements (MSSAs) with the owners 
of the conglomerates whose banks failed.22 The key word here is ‘Settlement’: 
literally, the government allowed the conglomerates to settle—that is, fully to 
discharge—their obligation to it by transferring ownership of portfolios of assets 
(business enterprises, for the most part) supposedly with a value at least equal to 
those obligations. By so doing, it incurred the risk that the actual value of these 
portfolios would be less than first thought, in which case it would not be in a 
position to insist that the conglomerate owners hand over additional assets, even if it 
was quite obvious that these were available in abundance. To make matters worse, 
the government was unable to find enough qualified business managers to take 
control of these newly acquired enterprises, leaving them effectively under the 
                                                 
20 Some conglomerate owners may have lost significant amounts by virtue of their previous exposure 
to exchange rate risk, but this is a separate issue. 
21 The single biggest debtor to the Indonesian bank Restructuring Agency is the Texmaco group. 
Texmaco defaulted on well over $1 billion in loans from the state banks, which had been made on the 
instructions of Soeharto (Fane 2000: 29–30; AsiaWeek.com 24 December 1999). The group was later 
protected against any attempt to seize management control of its assets by then president Wahid 
(Deutsche Bank Indonesia Newsletter, May 2000). There has been no change in this policy under the 
Megawati government and, rather predictably, the firm has recently defaulted on even its generously 
rescheduled borrowing obligations (Laksamana.Net 15 April 2003). 
22 The government’s prior decision to guarantee the banks’ liabilities was the first step along this road 
to ruin. An alternative approach to keeping the banks operational through the crisis at no cost to the 
government is set out in McLeod (2003). 
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control of their original owners and therefore ‘ripe for picking’. It should come as no 
surprise that the revenues from disposal of these assets will not come close to 
covering the government’s outlays on the bank bailout, nor that the conglomerates 
involved have gone from strength to strength.  
Foreign investors in the firing line 
In the early months of the crisis the conglomerates as a group gave priority to 
maintaining good relationships with their foreign creditors, not only continuing to 
service their borrowings but also repaying principal amounts in advance in order to 
avoid further losses if the rupiah continued to depreciate. Their ability to do so was 
increased by the willingness of the state banks to lend to them, the central bank’s 
willingness to lend to their banks, and the government’s willingness to guarantee 
those banks’ liabilities. This strategy of treating government institutions and the 
government itself as soft targets relied on the corrupt nature of the judiciary, which 
ensured that when the government came to press its claims against the 
conglomerates it would have virtually no chance of success. Such has been the 
success of this strategy, however, that several conglomerates have more recently 
shifted their attention to their foreign creditors—recognising that they, too, would be 
no match for them in Indonesia’s corrupt court system.23 
Two cases stand out. The first is that of Asia Pulp and Paper, which had continued to 
expand aggressively during the Asian crisis. Already heavily in debt, it succeeded in 
raising a further $404 million in April 1999 (Dow Jones International News 23 April, 
1999), and $123 million in September 2000 (Bisnis Indonesia 12 September, 2000). The 
group began to default on what was eventually revealed to be some $13.9 billion of 
foreign borrowings in March 2001, but has managed to avoid the takeover of its 
assets by its creditors thus far (Wall Street Journal, 2 April 2003). Complicating the 
issue is the fact that the company had borrowed heavily from Bank Internasional 
Indonesia, which was part of the same conglomerate (Sinar Mas, owned by the 
Wijaya family). This bank was one of those taken over by the Indonesian 
government when the banking system collapsed, and when APP defaulted on its 
                                                 
23 For example, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it virtually impossible for US investment 
funds to pay the bribes that are essential, in reality, to obtain a favorable court decision (even with a 
seemingly watertight legal case), or to have court decisions enforced. 
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debts these loans were shifted to IBRA, making it the group’s biggest single creditor. 
It appears to have been exploiting this dominant position to get the best deal it can, 
with little regard for the interests of the foreign creditors involved. Given the huge 
amount of money involved, it is no surprise that this has damaged Indonesia’s 
international standing to such an extent that the ambassadors of some 11 nations 
have written directly to the president seeking her intervention (Bloomberg 28 April, 
2003).  
The second is that of Tri Polyta Indonesia (TPI), which has sought to have the courts 
invalidate $185 million worth of bonds it issued before the crisis began. It recently 
succeeded in having a provincial court block the seizure of its assets by foreign 
bondholders after it began to default on payments in 1999. To add insult to injury, 
TPI is also suing bondholders for the return of interest previously paid, and for 
‘emotional distress caused to the company management’ (Bloomberg, 9 April 2003). If 
the court finds in favour of TPI, the bondholders’ $185 million asset will have been 
transformed into a liability of more than $600 million (the total amount now 
claimed)! It would be hard to imagine a more egregious example of the growing 
insecurity of property rights. 
Another important aspect of this shift in behaviour is that it has been accompanied 
by a redeployment of assets of the conglomerates. Whereas previously they collected 
rents and to a large extent reinvested them domestically, a large proportion of their 
wealth has now been relocated to countries such as China, Singapore, the US and 
Australia. This shifting of wealth offshore was, of course, the proximate cause of the 
large real depreciation of the rupiah. 
A watershed in Indonesia’s modern history 
The important question raised by the change in behaviour of large-scale business is 
whether it was just the first signal of a breakdown in the coherence of the franchise, 
to be followed by similar examples of opportunistic behaviour. Would this be the 
moment when Soeharto’s franchisees would start thinking in terms of killing the 
goose, rather than contenting themselves with collecting the supply of golden eggs?  
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There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that a breakdown of the franchise is 
exactly what has happened since the fall of Soeharto.24 It is this evidence that makes 
the forlorn example of Nigeria relevant to questions about what Indonesia’s future 
may hold. In the past, a major factor that differentiated Indonesia from countries like 
Nigeria was Soeharto’s ‘better class of corruption’ (McLeod 2000: 157). As we have 
seen, the level of private taxation was kept to a level that was low enough not to 
remove the incentive to undertake economic activity. At the same time, firms that 
harvested rents generated by the franchise could only do so by investing and re-
investing in the Indonesian economy. But in the absence of strong leadership able to 
enforce discipline over franchisees, the franchise has now collapsed. Its various 
branches and sub-branches are increasingly going their own way, with the result 
that the level of actual and anticipated private taxation is becoming oppressive in 
some areas of the economy.  
The problem is clearly manifested in the shifting of capital offshore, and the 
continued reluctance of the private sector to undertake new investment. Domestic 
and foreign firms that previously harvested rents generated by the franchise can no 
longer be confident of their ability to do so in an environment in which the 
leadership of government is genuinely subject to change at regular intervals, and 
they therefore have much weaker incentives to invest in Indonesia. Firms that 
previously put up with extortion, since it remained relatively light, now find it more 
threatening in the absence of centralised control. Banks that would like to be lending 
more are afraid to do so because they cannot rely on the courts to enforce their loan 
contracts.  
Paradoxically, the flowering of democracy itself is also imposing additional costs on 
the corporate sector. Soeharto had relatively little need to ‘tax’ corporations to fund 
Golkar’s election campaigns, because the whole election process was a charade in 
which Golkar could not lose. But now there are several parties with enough electoral 
support to be considered serious contenders to become members of governing 
coalitions, and each of them has large campaign funding requirements. No doubt 
many companies are making contributions to some or all of these parties in order to 
                                                 
24 One important aspect is the push by some provinces to break away from the Indonesian state. East 
Timor has already succeeded; secessionists in Aceh and Papua are actively pursuing their aims. 
Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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try to secure their fortunes through the next phase of the electoral cycle, as the 
infamous Bank Bali corruption case suggests (Fane 2000: 42). State enterprises are 
being privately taxed by the political parties for the same purpose. Unfortunately, 
using private tax revenues to fund election campaigns is akin to using them for 
consumption, rather than for reinvestment in productive activity, so far as their 
economic impact is concerned.  
There are many examples of changing behaviour on the part of the branches of the 
former franchise itself (as distinct from its outside beneficiaries and the political 
parties) that show that they have lost their coherence, and thus have become an 
obstacle to economic recovery, with the fall of Soeharto. This gives strong reason to 
doubt that Indonesia will be able to re-establish effective government in the near 
future. In addition to increasing the net rate of private tax imposed on firms and 
individuals, and increasing the degree of uncertainty about property rights and the 
future course of development, the effects of the collapse of the franchise are to 
increase the rate of exploitation of natural resources and to constrain the ability of 
more conscientious members of the government and the bureaucracy to implement 
sound economic policies. Consider the following examples. 
A judiciary out of control 
The judiciary has become much more prominent in the wake of the crisis, primarily 
because so many firms and banks have become insolvent—or have merely stopped 
servicing their debts. Large scale bankruptcy had rarely been an issue in the pre-
crisis era, but now many creditors suddenly began to file bankruptcy claims against 
defaulting debtors, and the judiciary found itself in a position in which it had far 
greater opportunities than before to benefit financially from the larger and more 
numerous cases coming before it. The biggest creditor of all was IBRA, the 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, a new part of the bureaucracy. IBRA was 
established in 1998 and given the task of recovering as much as possible of the 
government’s outlays on the bank bailout, and thus protecting the interests of the 
general public. But it found itself in an unequal contest of strength with the 
judiciary, which has been only too willing to exploit its position in order to extract 
large bribes from the defaulters—at IBRA’s expense. This, in turn, has created 
enormous pressure on the budget, and weakened the government’s ability to 
undertake the expenditures necessary in order to keep the economy in good shape 
(Pangestu and Goeltom 2001: 144). 
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Another party to suffer has been the foreign investment community, which used to 
rely heavily on the ‘franchise connection’ for the protection of its assets and activities 
in Indonesia (Cole and Slade 1998: 65),25 but has found the going very tough in 
Indonesia’s corrupt court system since Soeharto’s demise. One well-known example 
is the Canadian company, Manulife, which bought out the shares of its local joint 
venture partner, the Dharmala Group (Dick 2001: 30); the latter had had to surrender 
these shares to IBRA by virtue of the failure of its bank. After this deal had been 
completed, the Dharmala Group brought a case against Manulife, complaining that 
the shares in question were counterfeit (Australian Financial Review, 24 November 
2000). Much later, having failed to make this charge stick, Dharmala was able to 
persuade the court to declare the local subsidiary, Manulife Indonesia, bankrupt, 
although it clearly was not (Jakarta Post, June 14 2002). Eventually this decision was 
overturned, but only after considerable pressure was brought to bear—amongst 
others, by the Canadian government (Laksamana.Net, 22 January 2003).  
There have been other broadly similar cases in which foreign firms and investors 
have been very badly treated by the courts. The absurdity of the claim against 
bondholders of TPI, mentioned above, is an indication of how dysfunctional the 
judiciary has become: instead of protecting property rights it is now being used as an 
instrument of expropriation. In cases such as these, this unholy alliance between the 
judiciary and domestic capital conflicts with the efforts of Indonesia’s economic 
policymakers to persuade foreign capital to return, and thus to assist with economic 
recovery. 
An extortive legislature 
The legislature never stood in the way of successive Soeharto governments, the bulk 
of its members being able to be kept acquiescent by a relatively modest flow of 
patronage (Sherlock 2003: 4), mainly through the bureaucracy and Soeharto’s 
electoral machine, Golkar, which always accounted for a large majority of seats in 
parliament. Others who took their responsibilities more seriously felt powerless to 
oppose the regime. Since the fall of Soeharto the balance of power between the 
legislature and the executive has changed dramatically (ibid: 19–21). The people’s 
                                                 
25 Virtually all large scale foreign investors had felt obliged to have Soeharto family members or 
cronies as joint venture partners. 
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representatives have not been slow to seize upon the opportunity to extort funds 
from the bureaucracy in its attempts to carry on the business of government—
introducing new laws and regulations; implementing budgetary decisions such as 
the removal or reduction of subsidies and the divestment of state-owned enterprises; 
the appointment of individuals to positions such as top military posts, 
ambassadorships and the governorship of the central bank; and, in particular, 
IBRA’s attempts to divest its large portfolio of bank and corporate assets (Jakarta 
Post, January 23, 2001). It has not escaped the media’s attention that members of 
parliament are now looking much better dressed, and driving around in much more 
expensive vehicles, than before (Tempo Magazine, 7 October 2002). 
Newly active regional governments 
Since power and authority were so heavily concentrated at the centre under 
Soeharto, one of the first priorities of the reform movement was the devolution of 
some aspects of government to the regions—or ‘decentralisation’ as it is known in 
Indonesia. Two laws on decentralisation were among the flurry of new laws enacted 
under the short-lived Habibie government (Anwar 2001: 7–13): laws numbers 22 and 
25 of 1999, on Regional Government and Fiscal Balance between the Centre and the 
Regions, respectively. A feature of the second of these was the extraordinary decision 
to return large proportions of natural resource revenues to the provinces and 
districts where they originated; the apparent unconstitutionality of this arrangement 
seems to have been ignored (McLeod 2000: 31). In the past, oil and gas revenues, in 
particular, have played a big part in financing government expenditure throughout 
the nation, especially on the construction and maintenance of infrastructure 
(Ravallion 1988: 54). At face value, law 25/1999 greatly reduces the scope for a 
continuation of this, and thus provides a good example of parts of the old franchise 
now going their own way, regardless of the impact on other parts, and on the sense 
of nationhood in Indonesia. In reality, the implementation of this aspect of the law 
seems to bear little resemblance to what it appears to say (Fane, forthcoming). 
Just as the behaviour of members of parliament has changed as more genuine 
democracy has created many more opportunities for them to practice extortion, the 
move to decentralisation has resulted in a similar change in behaviour on the part of 
regional governments. The devolution of some of the functions of government to 
provincial and kabupaten levels has meant that regional governments no longer 
regard themselves as subservient to, and dependent upon, the central government. 
  22
In other words, they no longer see themselves as having to play by the rules of the 
Soeharto franchise—as indeed was the intention of the decentralisation reform.  
There are clear indications that regional government officials, like members of 
parliament at the national level, are adopting the attitude that the widespread 
opportunities for personal enrichment enjoyed hitherto by their central government 
counterparts have now shifted to the regional levels (see, for example, Tempo 
Magazine, April 22–28, 2003). One well-known example of this is the central 
government’s attempt to privatise its cement manufacturing company, PT Semen 
Gresik. A relatively small shareholding in this company had been divested some 
years ago to the Mexican company, Cemex (Cameron 1999: 25–6). At the time of this 
sale, Cemex was given an option to purchase a majority stake in the company. But 
when it moved to exercise this option, the provincial governments in West Sumatra 
and South Sulawesi, where two of the company’s major plants are located, moved to 
block the sale and, in effect, to seize control of the central government’s ownership 
stake (Deuster 2002: 11). The case was still in deadlock and the time of writing 
(Jakarta Post 21 May, 2003), and had helped to dampen what little enthusiasm the 
government had for privatisation. 
In another case, regional (provincial and kabupaten) governments in East Kalimantan, 
apparently acting on behalf of domestic private sector interests, have been 
attempting to expropriate a majority stake in the foreign coal mining company, PT 
Kaltim Prima (Australian Financial Review, 15 May 2002 and 10 February 2003). The 
effective usurpation of the powers of the courts, and the implicit threat of extortion 
by the army, as in both Aceh and Papua (Tempo Magazine, March 25–31 2003), have 
added to the concerns of foreign investors generally. Domestic mining companies 
have also been affected, and have cut back significantly on their investments.  
The episode has had even wider implications for the economy, however. The 
uncertainty created by the court attachment of the Tangguh natural gas field in 
Papua, which is owned by one of Kaltim Prima’s shareholders, is plausibly blamed 
for the loss to Australia of a huge contract to supply China with natural gas—even 
though the attachment was eventually overturned after the president intervened 
(Australian Financial Review 4 November, 2002). It is interesting to note also that in its 
efforts to overcome the malign impact of its own courts, the government has been 
forced to move even further away from its commitment to privatisation, by agreeing 
  23
to purchase 20% of the 51% share of Kaltim Prima that is required to be divested 
under the terms of its establishment. Presumably, the original owners would never 
have consented to allowing the regional governments to acquire a majority stake in 
the company. 
A further important aspect of the collapse of the franchise on regional governments’ 
behaviour is the enthusiasm with which they have begun to impose a range of taxes 
within, or at, their boundaries (SMERU 2002). In some cases this is well intended, 
but no doubt in others it is simply a manifestation of the fact that, by imposing 
formal taxes, the opportunity is created for officials to generate income for 
themselves by negotiating effective reductions or exemptions for the taxpaying 
entities in question. In any case, there is no doubt that this is making life more 
difficult for private firms. 
Turf wars between the army and the police  
Another of the reforms of the Habibie era was to separate the police from the armed 
forces. This has led to a more overt rivalry between these two parts of the former 
franchise—in particular, between the police and the army—which bears an 
interesting resemblance to the gang wars of the prohibition era in the US. This is not 
surprising. Both are involved with organised crime: gambling, prostitution and drug 
dealing, and with the practice of extortion, which is a natural extension of those 
activities (Straits Times 22 February, 2003). The competition between them from time 
to time breaks into the open, such as a recent case involving drug dealing in Sumatra 
in which a number of soldiers attacked a police station, killing several policemen 
(Asia Times, 15 October 2002).26 The business community can hardly ignore this kind 
of occurrence when it, itself, needs to rely on the police to protect its property rights. 
A police force that is heavily involved in organised crime is unlikely to perform this 
function effectively. 
The challenge of Reformasi: regaining effective government 
It is important to appreciate that the failure during the Soeharto decades to 
strengthen the public sector institutions’ capacity to serve the public interest was no 
                                                 
26 In an earlier episode, police stations in Madiun were attacked by the army, resulting in two civilian 
deaths and numerous injuries (Jakarta Post, 18 September 2001). 
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oversight. On the contrary, this was precisely what had helped make Soeharto 
strong and his extended family wealthy. His intention was to make himself safe from 
any attempt to remove him from office or to dilute his ability to make policy as he 
saw fit. Indonesia’s democracy was a sham, in which there was no chance that 
Soeharto would be removed through the normal election process. Nor was there any 
chance that the legislature, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces or the 
state-owned enterprises would put the interests of the people before those of the 
franchise.  
If now is genuinely to become the era of reformasi, the reform will have to apply to all 
of these public sector institutions. Reform requires not only getting rid of Soeharto, 
but also either getting rid of, or changing the behaviour of, a large proportion of his 
former franchisees.27 The difficulty of doing so has been underestimated, however. 
For example, many seem to think that reforming the armed forces requires little 
more than depriving them of their quota of seats in the DPR. This change  will be 
achieved in 2004, but in practical terms the army remains as strong as ever28—
indeed, it is probably even stronger now that Soeharto is not there to keep it under 
control.  
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SALARIES AS THE KEY TO REFORM 
The inadequacies of Indonesia’s public sector institutions are a reflection of 
Soeharto’s intention to encourage their officials to manage them in such fashion that 
they could personally benefit by exploiting their positions. He deliberately kept 
salaries low in the public sector institutions—especially at the higher levels—not out 
of any concern for the budget, but because he wanted to bring people into these 
positions who would be unconcerned about salary levels but would focus instead on 
                                                 
27 Earlier attempts to eliminate corruption under Soeharto were almost entirely cosmetic (Mackie 
1970; Mubyarto 1984); they failed because Soeharto had no intention that they should succeed. 
Current efforts face what is essentially the same problem: too many people in the public sector have 
much to lose, yet it is those same people that the public must rely upon to minimise corruption. 
28 This view was adumbrated by William Liddle at a conference at the US–Indonesia Society in 
Washington DC on ‘Political Succession and the 2004 Election’, March 20, 2003 (summary available at 
http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/2003/).  
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the opportunities they would have to earn illicit income as franchisees.29 By ensuring 
that officials within these institutions had a common interest in the effective 
functioning of the franchise, the president was able to co-opt them to serve his own 
interests.  
Many young people with good intentions were recruited to these institutions as well 
who had every intention of doing their work well for the benefit of the public. Such 
individuals tended to languish in the ‘dry’ areas, and for the most part they found 
that the path to promotion was heavily restricted unless they wanted to buy into the 
franchise. Some of them did so, while others left to seek their livelihoods elsewhere. 
Many more simply accepted their fate, enduring a low standard of living, and 
forgoing any real opportunity for promotion to levels at which they were capable of 
functioning effectively.30 A few made their way up through the hierarchy by virtue 
of Soeharto’s recognition of the need for competence in at least some areas of policy 
making. 
The public sector institutions cannot be reformed in the absence of a far-reaching 
restructuring of their Soeharto franchise salary scales and radical changes to their 
personnel management practices, especially in relation to recruitment, promotion 
and discipline—including bringing criminal charges against those found to have 
acted corruptly. Much higher salaries are needed at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
Salaries need to be high enough to attract honest and well motivated people, and to 
give them an incentive to perform well in order to achieve promotion to higher 
levels. It is not necessary to set salaries that would match present-day official salaries 
plus typical earnings from graft and corruption, however. There are many people 
who would be willing to work in these institutions provided that their salaries are 
broadly in line with those of people in similar professions working in the private 
                                                 
29 This was reflected in a noteworthy aspect of the prevailing culture—namely, a widespread 
awareness of differences in the availability of opportunities for graft; areas where such opportunities 
were abundant became known as ‘wet’ (basah). 
30 The often heard argument that public sector officials are ‘forced’ to engage in corruption by low 
salaries is an insult to those who choose not to do so. 
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sector, but it will be impossible to attract a sufficient number of such people unless 
this is so.31 
At the same time that salary scales are restructured it will be essential to put 
considerably more emphasis on performance appraisal and discipline, and to reform 
the processes of recruitment and promotion so as to make them transparent and fair. 
Presumably the latter will involve formal selection and promotion committees, 
whose membership would be chosen so as to provide some element of outside 
scrutiny. Records would need to be kept of advertisements for the positions in 
question, applications, and justifications by committees for their decisions. A further 
aid to transparency would be to make promotions and appointments subject to 
appeal by unsuccessful applicants. These kinds of procedures have taken years, if 
not decades, to evolve in other countries, and to become part of the corporate 
cultures of the organisations in question, so all of this clearly amounts to a massive 
and difficult undertaking. If Indonesia is to regain effective government, however, a 
new set of positive and negative incentives must be created to replace those that 
made the old franchise so successful. 
Obstacles to salary reform 
The guiding principle for setting salaries should be to set them no higher than is 
necessary to attract people with the requisite skills and capabilities for the positions 
in question. Present salaries at the lower levels appear to be adequate for this 
purpose, so no adjustment is required. Adjustments will be necessary, however, and 
in increasingly large proportions, the higher the level of the position in the 
organisation in question.32 It must be anticipated that this will result in strong 
opposition from those who miss out. People who are currently prepared to accept 
                                                 
31 Public sector salaries may be able to be kept a little below those in the private sector, to the extent 
employment in the former is seen to provide additional, non-pecuniary benefits. 
32 Filmer and Lindauer (2000) argue that the common perception that civil servants are greatly 
underpaid relative to the private sector is not supported by available evidence, claiming that extant 
studies that directly compare public and private sector remuneration are unrepresentative. They 
contend that low level civil servants are actually somewhat better paid, and that the salary shortfall in 
the higher echelons is much smaller than popularly supposed. The latter unexpected finding may 
have been driven by survey respondents having included ‘unofficial’ income in their earnings. The 
issue is also clouded by the existence of a wide array of allowances in addition to base salaries, 
including in some cases free accommodation, the use of official cars, free telephone access and so on. 
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their current salary level are bound to complain if people at higher levels are given 
salary increases when they themselves are given relatively less, or no increase at all. 
Political parties, mindful of their need to win seats at elections, will be only too 
pleased to give voice to these complaints—just as they have done, for example, when 
the government has attempted to reduce the level of subsidies inherent in the pricing 
of fuel, electricity and phone calls (Waslin 2003: 6).  
Another obstacle to salary reform is the reality of the budgetary stringency to which 
Indonesia is now subject. It will be argued, even by those who agree in principle 
with a change in the salary structure, that now is not the time for it.  After all, the 
government is finding it very difficult to finance even its normal expenditures, given 
the huge burden it acquired as a result of guaranteeing creditors of the banking 
system when it was in the process of meltdown in 1998. Indeed, this suggests 
another reason why it will be exceedingly difficult politically to bring about large 
salary increases for the upper echelons of public sector institutions. The general 
public is well aware that it is now having to make good the Soeharto-linked 
conglomerates’ failure to repay their obligations to the government—even though 
their owners are obviously still extremely wealthy—and is rightly suspicious of the 
extent to which this has been the result of collusion with senior members of the 
bureaucracy.33 
Counter arguments and strategies 
In anticipation of these obstacles, an appropriate way forward might be as follows. 
First, the budget stringency argument could be used as a partial justification for not 
extending large salary increases down to the lower levels of the bureaucracy and the 
military: the government simply could not afford to do this. As we move up the 
hierarchy of the relevant institutions, however, the rapidly declining number of 
positions means that it is not out of the question to finance large salary increases.  
                                                 
33 The Megawati government, in consultation with the IMF, recently announced an extraordinary 
‘release and discharge’ decree (Presidential Instruction No. 8/2002) aimed to obviate any possible 
further claim against defaulters that had been ‘cooperative’ in their dealings with IBRA (Jakarta Post, 2 
January 2003). This makes it highly unlikely that the bulk of these obligations will ever be repaid, 
although there have been strong protests aimed at having the decree annulled.  
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In any case, provided they are accompanied by appropriate changes to personnel 
management practices, higher salaries will pay for themselves by bringing about a 
significant improvement the quality of management. One of the most obvious areas 
where this can be seen is within the Ministry of Finance, and specifically within its 
revenue raising arms such as the taxation directorate and the customs service. It is 
well-known that the ministry has failed to widen the income tax base or to extract 
taxpayers’ full tax liabilities from them (Straits Times 29 March 2003), and that the 
customs service is rife with corruption (Jakarta Post 5 February 2002). Improving the 
quality of personnel and the incentives they face in this ministry alone could be 
expected to result in very significantly increased taxation revenues. Similar 
comments apply in relation to the forestry and mining ministries, which have a 
similar record of underachievement in relation to the collection of natural resource 
royalties.  
The government could also generate much more revenue from its marine resources 
if reform of the navy resulted in a more serious effort to deal with illegal fishing 
activity (Jakarta Post 10 March, 2000). And with better management and a strong 
focus on discipline it can be expected that procurement throughout the public sector 
will become much more cost-efficient, resulting in large savings in outlays. In short, 
salary structure reform in the public sector is not only essential, but also fiscally 
feasible. 
Second, although a new salary structure would be determined (based on an 
intensive study of comparable private sector employee remuneration)34 and made 
public, the government would not provide automatic salary increases to incumbents. 
Instead the incumbents would be invited to, in effect, reapply for their own jobs—
but at the new higher salary levels—in competition with anybody else who wished 
to apply, whether from within or from outside the institution.35  
                                                 
34 If Filmer and Lindauer (2000) are correct in their view that public sector salaries are not in fact 
greatly different from those in the private sector, then of course the financial aspect of the reform 
would pose little problem for the government. 
35 Lindsey (2001: 57) documents ‘the aggressive opposition from the incumbent Supreme Court bench’ 
to the threatened appointment of an ‘outsider’ as the chief justice. To offset resistance to this process 
in all the public sector institutions it might also be worthwhile in some cases to offer voluntary 
redundancy packages to incumbents who might prefer retirement to going through this process.  
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This in itself would be a highly significant break with current practice, which is to 
recruit only at base levels, implying that higher levels can only be filled by 
promotion from within. This practice helped to strengthen Soeharto’s franchise by 
creating strong incentives for employees to act as their superiors wanted them to, 
since the only path to career advancement was upwards within the individual’s 
present organisation. By changing this approach the government would make clear 
that it would not reward countless public sector officials that had abused their 
positions in the past, or that had been appointed to their present positions on 
grounds other than their competence to do the job.36 Rather, it would only pay the 
new salaries to the best individuals available for the positions in question. At the 
same time, it would be important for the government to emphasise that the path to 
higher salaries would be through promotion—and that individuals could now 
expect to be promoted on merit. 
Sequencing 
If the proposed reform amounted to nothing more than salary increases, then all that 
would need to be done would be to determine the new salary scales and implement 
them. On the contrary, however, the reform is intended to get the best available 
people into each position, and this entails the revision of appointments throughout 
all the public sector institutions. Obviously it would not be feasible to undertake 
such an enormous task all at once. Moreover, at the very top levels, appointments 
will not follow the standard procedure of advertising positions and having selection 
committees choose between applicants. At these levels, appointments will continue 
to be political, with choices made by the president and his or her advisers. 
An appropriate way to proceed, therefore, would be for the incoming president to 
make all of the ministerial appointments, and perhaps additional appointments at 
the very top levels in each of the ministries (in consultation with the new ministers), 
and then to move in the same manner in relation to the judiciary and the 
                                                 
36 Such a large proportion of public sector officials have some involvement in petty corruption that it 
would not be feasible to exclude them all from reappointment or promotion; the sensible approach 
would be to ignore the past in these cases, while making it very clear that even this would not be 
tolerated in the future. 
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military/police.37 Beyond that, the first task of those appointed to these top positions 
would be to advertise and fill positions at the newly determined salary scales for the 
next one or two levels—whether by re-appointment of incumbents, promotions, or 
recruitment from outside. Thus the procedure would be to work from the top down, 
appointing people at the new salaries, and then relying on them to repeat the process 
at the next levels down in the hierarchy.38 
The armed forces as a special case 
Reform of the armed forces is the most difficult area of all, since they—in particular, 
the army—represent a credible threat to the continuation of democratic (civilian) 
government. One problem is the same as with the other public sector institutions: the 
low level of salaries offered in the past was deliberately intended to encourage their 
personnel to join, and support, the franchise. Moreover, the forces were deliberately 
encouraged to find ways to fund their own activities (a practice that began during 
the independence struggle, and in which Soeharto himself had been involved in the 
late 1950s) (Elson 2001:60–75), which led them to become heavily involved in 
business activity, both legal and illegal, and in extortion. Soeharto’s strategy was to 
appoint high level armed forces personnel who could find ways of funding their 
regular activities, while at the same time taking some for themselves. They in turn 
expected their subordinates to act in similar fashion.  
Thus the problem of asserting civilian control over the armed forces is not as simple 
as finding enough revenue in the budget to fully fund the legitimate operations of 
the forces. Personnel at all levels have incomes well above their regular salaries, and 
in many cases their total incomes no doubt far exceed market clearing levels for 
individuals with similar capabilities. If the new strategy is to put a stop to military 
involvement in illegal activities and in taxing the private sector so as to generate 
additional personal income, then the implication is that many military officers will be 
                                                 
37 It will be up to the people to choose their parliamentary representatives, of course, but with a 
reformed bureaucracy and judiciary the government would be in a position to bring about reform 
here, too, by taking firm action against members of parliament involved in corrupt activity. 
38 Lindsey (2001: 51–2) also argues in favour of this approach in relation to the reform of the judiciary. 
Alas, whether as a result of strenuous opposition from the incumbent Supreme Court  judges, or then 
president Wahid’s own second thoughts about the full implications of Indonesia having a more 
honest and capable judiciary, these hopes came to nothing. 
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made considerably worse off as a result, despite significant salary increases. These 
officers can be expected to resist, and it must be assumed that they will be well-
equipped to resist more strongly than corrupt members of the bureaucracy, for 
example. 
In particular, it is well known that there is a close relationship between the army and 
the police on the one hand, and organised gangs of thugs, known as preman, on the 
other. These gangs have been used more or less as subcontractors for the purpose of 
extortion, and for responding to threats to the status quo—such as the East Timorese 
move to secede. A recent example of this is the brazen physical attack on staff of 
Tempo Magazine, which had published certain allegations against a businessman 
alleged to be involved in criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution and drugs 
(Jakarta Post 13 March 2003). The episode demonstrated clearly the existence of a 
mutually advantageous relationship with the police in Jakarta. Cleaning up the army 
and police would therefore seem to require some strategy to deal with the street 
gangs as well; it would be unrealistic to assume that the preman (and their army and 
police associates) would acquiesce in the face of this threat to their livelihood. 
Is it possible to conceive of wide-ranging reform that, for the time being, puts the 
armed forces and the police in the too hard basket? Perhaps it is. It seems to me, 
though, that the government needs to signal a firm intention in the medium- to long-
term to bring the financing of the military and police entirely within the budget, to 
put an end to their involvement in business activity, and to increase their degree of 
professionalism. It will be necessary to seek out and promote officers with high 
ideals, and to steadily increase budgetary allocations to the military, with an 
intention to push forward with this to completion within a specific time frame. At 
the same time, however, there needs to be an increase in the proportion of budgetary 
funds allocated to the police, and a corresponding reduction in the proportion to the 
army, given that the need for an improvement in domestic law and order is great, 
while external threats to the nation are limited.39 Such an initiative would need to be 
complemented by making the military genuinely responsible to a civilian minister 
                                                 
39 The main external threat appears not to be from any other nation, but from pirates (The Australian 6 
May 2003).  
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for defence, and by discontinuing Soeharto’s practice of having the commander of 
the armed forces in the cabinet. 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM AND RECOVERY 
The foregoing argument has suggested that the process of reform must be driven 
from the top down. Since it begins with the president, the question of who becomes 
the next president is crucial to Indonesia’s prospects for reform and recovery. To be 
a candidate for the presidency requires the support of the major political parties, but 
their own actions (and inaction) as members of Megawati’s coalition government 
suggests strongly that these parties are less interested in reform, and more interested 
in gaining office for the opportunities this presents for the accumulation of wealth 
and power. If they do have a genuine interest in reform, there is little on the public 
record by way of concrete, credible strategy to achieve it. It is, therefore, difficult to 
imagine that the approach suggested here is likely to be followed. Unfortunately, it 
is even more difficult to imagine effective reform by other means. 
Current reform efforts  
Current reform efforts rely on quite different approaches: training, and anti-
corruption initiatives. The emphasis on training assumes that public sector officials 
desire to further the public interest, but are prevented from doing so by a lack of the 
necessary skills. In reality, the provision of training in a context in which officials’ 
remuneration is far below their earning power (augmented by opportunities for 
corrupt conduct), and in which the link between performance and promotion is 
weak, is like pouring water into desert sand. It is simply naïve to expect officials to 
use their skills in the interests of the public unless they have appropriate incentives 
to do so.  
Anti-corruption initiatives, such as establishment of the Commission to Audit the 
Wealth of State Officials, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the National 
Ombudsman’s Commission (Sherlock 2002), assume that what is lacking is 
enforcement of the norms of proper behaviour. While such mechanisms have an 
important role to play, they can only be expected to be effective in systems in which 
corruption and malpractice are the exception rather than the rule. When these 
problems are endemic, as they are in Indonesia, mechanisms that try to monitor and 
penalise officials’ misbehaviour are of little use. The problem is that firm action 
needs to be taken against those found to be corrupt by other individuals within the 
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same system, who are more than likely to be involved in malfeasance themselves.40 
This is evident in the failure to provide these new agencies sufficient resources or 
powers for them to be able to function effectively and, for example, by the 
president’s failure to take any action against her Attorney-General, who was found 
to have failed to report all of his assets, and whose wealth far exceeds what he could 
have been expected to save on the basis of his official remuneration (Laksamana.Net, 3 
October 2002).41   
In short, the various internally and externally driven current efforts to reform 
Indonesia’s public sector institutions cannot succeed, because they fail to deal with 
the underlying problems of unrealistically low salaries at the higher echelons, and 
grossly defective personnel management practices. Worse still, the focus on these 
other approaches lulls all concerned into thinking that something important and 
useful is being done about reform, which merely serves to postpone the day when an 
Indonesian government will face up to the real issues. In this sense, misguided 
attempts at reform are probably worse than none at all. 
CONCLUSION  
If Indonesia’s democracy is to be made effective—if Indonesia is to have much of a 
future—it is essential that discussion of the obvious need for reform of the public 
sector institutions moves beyond platitudes (see, for example, Rais 2003) and 
presidential exhortations and lamentations (Laksamana.Net, 7April, 2003; Jakarta Post 
May 20, 2003) to meaningful analysis and concrete suggestions as to the nature and 
implementation of such reform. The suggestion presented here is that the key to 
reform is to provide strong positive and negative incentives to good performance 
throughout these institutions. They will be well managed if the individuals that 
comprise them find this to be in their own interests.  
                                                 
40 The Commission to Audit the Wealth of State Officials reported in mid 2002 that only 35% of 
judges, prosecutors and police officers had obeyed the directive to report their assets (Jakarta Post 22 
July 2002). 
41 Coalition partner Golkar’s secretary and DPR chairman, Akbar Tanjung, has also been permitted to 
continue in office even though having been found guilty of corruption (Laksamana.Net January 17, 
2003). 
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It is hard to be optimistic as to whether much progress can be expected. Not only 
will such reforms be resisted by the individuals whose present behaviour is at the 
heart of the problem, but it seems almost inevitable that they will also be opposed by 
well-meaning people who imagine corruption, collusion and nepotism can be made 
to go away by other means. In the absence of more visionary and capable potential 
leaders than any on the horizon, the prospect for Indonesia’s economy even to 
‘muddle along’ at 3–4% growth seems limited. 
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